https://www.c-span.org/video/?465455-1/us-turkey-ceasefire-syria&start=548

“Could we have stopped Turkey from coming in?” William V. Roebuck asked in an internal memo.



In an internal memo, the senior American diplomat in northern Syria criticized the Trump administration for failing to try harder to deter Turkey from invading northern Syria last month.

Below is the complete text of the memo written by William V. Roebuck, as obtained by The New York Times.

Subject: Present at the Catastrophe: Standing By as Turks Cleanse Kurds in Northern Syria and De-Stabilize our D-ISIS Platform in the Northeast
Assessment attached.
Drafter: wr
Present at the Catastrophe: Standing By as Turks Cleanse Kurds in Northern Syria and De-Stabilize our D-ISIS Platform in the Northeast
Summary: Turkey’s military operation in northern Syria, spearheaded by armed Islamist groups on its payroll, represents an intentioned-laced effort at ethnic cleansing, relying on widespread military conflict targeting part the Kurdish heartland along the border and benefiting from several widely publicized, fear-inducing atrocities these forces committed. Our military forces and diplomats were on the ground in the northeast at the time. The Turkey operation damaged our regional and international credibility and has significantly destabilized northeastern Syria. It also continues to place Kurdish society in northeastern Syria — as a people on ancestral lands — in serious jeopardy. We should insist Turkey bear all the diplomatic and reputational costs for this venture and seek to prevent President Erdogan from flooding this de-populated zone with Syrian Arab refugees in Turkey. Our diplomacy will also need to recognize we — with our local partners — have lost significant leverage and inherited a shrunken, less stable platform to support both our CT efforts and the mission of finding a comprehensive political solution for Syria. End Summary.

US INTERESTS IMPLICATED IN TURKEY’S ACTIONS
Ever since President Trump’s withdrawal announcement, together with the reaction, and the eventual settling on keeping a residual US presence to protect the oil and fight ISIS, there has been no shortage of analysis about the costs and benefits for the U.S. withdrawal. The potential damage to U.S. credibility was much discussed and seemed to help shape where our policy eventually ended up. But so far overlooked in the current context is an additional factor which has great potential for negative impact in damage to U.S. credibility: what can only be described as war crimes and ethnic cleansing. As more news emerges from northeast Syria of Turkish/Turkish supported groups/organizations (TSO) atrocities and expulsion of citizens, the reputational risks to the US and criticism of our decisions will rise. To protect our interests, we need to speak out more forcefully, publicly and privately, to reduce the blame placed on the US and to highlight the Turkish responsibilities for civilian wellbeing. By acting now, we have a chance to minimize the damage for us and hopefully correct some of the impact of Turkey’s current policies, as we seek to implement the President’s guidance for our presence in northeastern Syria.

STARTING AT THE BEGINNING
As the lone U.S. diplomat on the ground in northeastern Syria this last few weeks and one of the few in country over the past two years, I have worked closely with the SDF and its affiliated civilian institutions. I met regularly with SDF Commander General Mazloum and his lieutenants, as his forces cooperated with our Special Operations Forces against ISIS, as we took down their so-called Caliphate and administered a whipping that left their leadership dispersed and their ranks on their heels, running for cover or surrendering. I was present near Baghouz for the final days of the fighting and the SDF declaration of victory at Omar fields. I spoke with Mazloum just after the killing of Baghdadi this week, when he described the critical role SDF intelligence and planning played in the operation.

MEETING WITH THE COMMANDER
In our meetings, Mazloum would regularly provide updates on the joint U.S.-SDF pressure they were keeping ISIS under, including large back clearance operations of previously cleared territory and targeted operations to capture ISIS commanders and local leaders in sprawling, strategically located Deir a-Zour province. He described the uneven but relatively sturdy efforts to provide security and local governance in the northeast and recounted his regular outreach to Sunni Arab tribal leaders in Deir a-Zour and Raqqa to maintain their support for the SDF and address their grievances. Strategic in his thinking, optimistic, and strong believer in the importance of the relationship with the United States, Mazloum never failed to impress visiting military officers, senior officials, and regional experts with his pragmatism and pronounced willingness to work with the U.S.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT REALITIES IN THE NORTHEAST
Over the past year and a half, I worked closely with local civil councils in Raqqa, Manbij, and Shedadi, and visited dozens of other local government bodies in smaller, far-flung locales all over the northeast, all of them relatively nascent organizations the SDF and its civilian affiliates set up to assist in the delivery of essential services and help communities take the first steps to recover from damage the war wrought in their areas. Many of these rickety little councils were out in Arab villages and townships barely worthy of being called population centers. But the SDF/SDC had organized security and local governance throughout the northeast and this chunk of Syria representing close to a third of the country’s total area, was secure and peaceful for the most part.

These governance structures were flawed in some ways: they were not representative enough in many cases — particularly in Arab areas — and relied too heavily on Kurdish advisors usually affiliated at lower levels with the ruling PYD political party. But there was always the hope — and some limited evidence — these structures could evolve and become more representative, by including Kurds outside the PYD and more empowered, independent Arabs, and ultimately through holding free and fair local elections, when conditions permitted. Given the political models in the region the SDF had to work with, and given the ongoing civil war and fight against ISIS, it wasn’t a bad start. Kurds understood clearly they held more territory than their demographic and historic presence would normally suggest, but it was viewed as an important bargaining chip for them — and us.

TURKEY’S BORDER CONCERNS
In all the time I was in the northeast, since January 2018, I heard — and sometimes delivered — points that articulated appreciation about Turkey’s legitimate security concerns regarding the border with Syria. And yet that border stayed quiet on the Syrian side the entire time — over 20 months — I have been in Syria, until Turkey violated it with its October Peace Spring military operation. When quietly called on this discrepancy, a senior U.S. official explained to me, “well, it’s a perceived threat (because of ideological and other affiliations between the PYD and the PKK) that Turkey feels, so we have to take it seriously.” But eventually the talking point became reality. We began speaking as if there really were attacks across the border into Turkey, causing real casualties and damage. But these were chimerical — strongly felt perhaps — but palpable only as fears and concerns, not on the ground.

Meanwhile our SDF partners did everything they told us they would do to fight ISIS, and did it with motivation, impressive command and control, and ability to absorb casualties. They suffered over 10,000 fatalities and some 20,000 wounded. Not imagined casualties but truly dead young men and women and thousands suffering appalling, life-altering injuries.

OUR FIGHT WILL BE YOUR FIGHT
We asked these people to take on this fight. It was our fight, and Europe’s, and all of the international community’s. And yes, it was Syria’s Kurds’ fight too. They had fought ISIS to a standstill in Kobane and with our help back in 2014-2015, repulsed them. But we asked them to fight for us, for the international community, to put almost exclusively on their shoulders this burden of taking down what remained of the Caliphate. For their own reasons and calculations, they did so. One could argue that in a transactional sense, we owe them nothing. We looked after our interests and they made their own calculations.

But let’s be honest. They are a relatively small, largely local non-state actor. In some ways we, seeking a local partner to fight ISIS with us, may have inadvertently put a target on their back that did not exist before we came on the scene. At that time, while Turkey might have looked upon the PYD and its YPG militia as affiliated PKK organizations, it did not view them as an existential threat, the way Turkey has increasingly viewed them since they partnered with us. In 2015 senior PYD officials like Saleh Muslim and Elham Ahmed visited Turkey, meeting with senior GOT officials. They were not labeled terrorists or subjected to the language of extermination or other harsh rhetoric. But our military partnership with the SDF, never accepted by Turkey, over time seriously riled the Turks and seems to have caused them to see the YPG militia, the backbone of the SDF, together with the PYD political party, as an existential threat. In tandem with internal political developments in Turkey that left Erdogan beholden to a far-right political party with visceral anti-Kurd tendencies, and gave him his own reasons to demonize Syria’s Kurds, the dynamic for the current tragedy was set in motion.

OPERATION PEACE SPRING: ETHNIC CLEANSING BY ANOTHER NAME
One day when the diplomatic history is written, people will wonder what happened here and why officials didn’t do more to stop it or at least speak out more forcefully to blame Turkey for its behavior: an unprovoked military operation that has killed some 200 civilians, left well over 100,000 people (and counting) newly displaced and homeless because of its military operation targeting Tel Abyad and Ras Ayn, but also Kobane, and Ayn Isa, and dozens of Kurdish villages surrounding each of these towns. Using the threat and intense application of military force, much of it supplied by armed groups — Turkish Supported Organizations, or TSO, some of whom formerly allied with ISIS or al-Qaida — Turkey has emptied or is emptying major Kurdish population centers and Turkish officials — led by President Erdogan speaking at UNGA in September — broadcast their intention to fill these emptied areas with Syrian Arab refugees currently in Turkey. This de-populating of Kurdish areas benefited from several well-publicized, fear-inducing atrocities the TSO committed in the early days of the military operation that accelerated civilian flight.

Let’s be clear: this is intentioned-laced ethnic cleansing; it is a war crime, when proven. The US government should be much more forceful in calling Turkey out for this behavior. We should also make much clearer to Turkey, in public and private statements and with the leverage we have at our disposal, that the people run out of their homes must be able to safely return. The TSO gangs must be withdrawn. And as President Trump himself warned in a similar context, we should take steps to re-impose economic sanctions if Turkey attempts to carry out its threat of flooding this area with refugees, outside of any UN-sanctioned process.

This gets to the issue of whether we promised the Kurds we would protect them against Turkey. And it is true we did not utter those words or make that specific commitment. When the attack on Afrin occurred last winter, we told people, based on Washington’s guidance to reassure our partners “We can’t do anything about Afrin (which Turkey and its jihadi mercenaries attacked last year, dispossessing 170,000 people) because we aren’t there; no troops or air power. But we are here in the northeast. We are your close partner. Afrin can’t happen here.”

SPEAKING OUT
But it has happened. And on a much larger scale, as the US and its forces and its small diplomatic contingent — partners to the SDF — stood by and watched. We know in detail what has been done and continues to be implemented. That presence, our partnership with the SDF, and our close relations with Ankara make it incumbent on us to speak out if we are to place the blame for abuses where it lies and avoid risking damage to US credibility and reputation.

THE NEW SITUATION
The situation is not over. Observers who have seen these TSO in action — read their blood-curdling threats on social media against Kurds, and absorbed the publicly stated intention of Turkish officials to flood the area with Syrian Arab refugees — are warning that worse human rights violations are on the horizon. Beyond any specific war crimes or other abuses these groups might commit, the most wide-scale abuse — the clearing of widespread settled areas of an ethnic group and replacing it with another— partly implemented, partly still in the planning stages, must be placed on Turkey’s doorstep. And Turkey is forging ahead with a bold aggressiveness on the ground and in its rhetoric that has left the international community sputtering ineffectually.

PROTECTING THE OIL
We are now staying in the northeast with a residual force, to safeguard oil facilities and continue the fight against ISIS. The decision to stay is a good one, even if the “protection of the oil” rationale plays into toxic Middle Eastern conspiracy theories that will need to be lanced with careful, sustained messaging reinforcing the truism that Syria’s oil is Syria’s and for the benefit of the Syrian people.

THE NORTHEAST: SIDESHOW TO A CATASTROPHE
Viewing the current situation in a broader context, I do not say there were easy choices here in Syria and that we failed to make them because of ignorance or bad intentions or lack of resolve. U.S. policy makers, Coalition diplomats and their leaders, have done their best to contain the maelstrom that Syria has become. This situation on the northern border is in some ways a sideshow of that larger catastrophe. But it is a catastrophic sideshow and it is to a significant degree of our making.

COULD WE HAVE STOPPED TURKEY FROM COMING IN?
And we are here. Could we actually have prevented Turkey from coming in and wreaking havoc, with tougher bully pulpit diplomacy, blunter threat of sanctions and tactical adjustments of our limited forces, creating more observation posts on the border and beefed up patrols, making it difficult for Turkey attack without risking wounding or killing a U.S. soldier, something Turkey would be loathe do? As we did successfully last December when Turkey similarly threatened? It’s a tough call, and the answer is probably not, given our small footprint, Turkey’s NATO get-out-of-jail-free card, its looming proximity on the border, and the powerful, if misdirected, motivation it had to address its real terrorist threat from the PKK faced inside Turkey. But we won’t know because we didn’t try.

A FEW PROPOSALS FOR POLICY
The President’s recent decision to keep some US forces on the ground salvages an important piece of our effort against ISIS and it preserves operating space for the SDF. But the subsequent Russia-Turkey Sochi Agreement muddies any clarity to the situation on the ground; in tandem with Turkey’s Peace Spring operation and the SDF’s piecemeal deals to bring in Syrian regime and Russian forces in specific locations, the northeast has become a much less stable (and much smaller) platform for our D-ISIS mission. In some ways the SDF is living on borrowed time; what makes that potentially tragic is the sleight-of-hand Turkey has achieved, visiting its military solution not just on the SDF (with its acknowledged YPG backbone and that group’s diffuse ideological affiliations with the PKK) but on the innocent Kurdish population that lived in hundreds of villages in this northern area — along with Muslim and Christian Arabs — common people who live, farm, keep shops, and go to school in this border area.

What should we do, to shape our policy, given these complicated, painful realities?

1. Make clear to Turkey, publicly and even more bluntly, privately, that it will bear all the costs for its military operation. That includes the bill for our heavily damaged interests: the undercut fight against ISIS, the wrecking of our partner force, and the significant damage to our credibility as a partner in the region and beyond. In addition, Turkey should absorb the full brunt of international opprobrium for the ethnic cleansing it has perpetrated and demographic change it is yet threatening to do. At every turn we should make clear, Turkey and its leadership will be on their own in trying to justify these actions. And that we and the international community are carefully observing the fate of the remainder of Syrian Kurdish society — still on its lands in northern Syria but in significant jeopardy as Operation Peace Spring shows no sign of winding down.

2. Consider using our remaining time here in northeast Syria — as we fight ISIS — to stabilize the situation for the Kurdish population (and other populations living side-by-side with them) remaining in the north, help the SDF salvage a long-term platform to maintain the fight against ISIS and explore how it seeks to responsibly re-integrate into the Syrian State. That is a process that has already started, in a preliminary, slapdash manner, driven by Turkey’s military operation and our inability to find the policy levers to stop Turkey’s action. In addition to holding the oil fields, with the SDF, we hold other cards we can play, including the timing of our exit from the northeast and unblocking regional normalization and reconstruction funds at the appropriate time.

3. Acknowledge, and this will be a bitter pill to swallow, that the road to finding a solution in Syria probably leads through Moscow, at least in the first instance, rather than the UN. There may have been other options, more directly connected to UNSCR 2254 — and everyone involved in those efforts deserves credit for doing everything possible to achieve them — but Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring has so destabilized the northeast and devalued the leverage we had with our extensive presence and our once dominant SDF partners, that it is doubtful that road is open anymore, in any real sense. We can keep slogging on, and we probably will, letting the constitutional committee dynamics play out (with much less de-legitimizing impact on Assad than we expect) and possibly opening the way for elections in 2021, although probably with marginal impact on Assad’s rule.

4. Maintain the relationship with Turkey. Insisting an ally pay all the diplomatic and reputational costs — and even do restitution (in terms of allowing Kurds to return to their villages and homes) for a military operation that directly damaged our interests is not the same as dispensing with a valued bilateral relationship. Turkey sees no problem with pursuing its interests with vigor and even ruthlessness, regardless of the costs to us, even as it values its relationship to the US. This is the way the great game is played. And we need to play it just as aggressively with Turkey, while insisting on its rock-solid place in NATO and our strong bilateral strategic and commercial relationship.

5. Use our Residual Presence to Shape a Responsible Drawdown in Syria. President Trump has been clear and consistent about wanting to get our forces out of Syria. The residual presence to protect the oil and fight ISIS buys us some time. We hold other cards we can play, including the timing of our exit from the northeast and unblocking regional normalization and reconstruction funds at the appropriate time. A responsible drawdown will require an honest appraisal of our shrunken leverage — Operation Peace Spring forced us withdraw from half of the northeast and has seriously weakened our local partner — and a willingness to hold realistic conversations with the parties who exercise influence, including the SDF, Moscow, Ankara, and possibly even Damascus, to outline exactly how the northeast will be reintegrated into the Syrian state. Turkey, despite being the last remaining supporter of the Syrian opposition, is no doubt, already having these same conversations with Moscow and Damascus in order to resolve the Syrian conflict in its favor.

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/07/us/politics/memo-syria-trump-turkey.html

https://npasyria.com/blog.php?id_blog=4088&sub_blog=15+&name_blog=%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86+%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%88%D9%84+%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%85%D9%83%D9%86..+%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A1+%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%8A+%D8%A3%D9%86%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B0%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%8B#.XYt3HjVA1Kg.twitter

Article:
https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/ab5ea6b0-02c6-4e08-a822-d0fd914a8b11



Transcript interview Suad Mustafa, the mother of slain Syrian Kurdish politician Hevrin Khalaf:

She left me on Friday, October 11, 2019. I told her that I wanted to be with her, but she refused. [Turkey] had attacked Ain Diwar on the 9th of October; I told her that Erdogan has attacked Erdogan, and there is a chaos, so please let me to be with you. She refused again, and said that she had to go anyway. I told her to be careful, and asked if she could at least delay her trip. She said, if I don’t go today, and something happens, that won’t be good, and she wouldn’t betray her people. I asked her to carry a small copy of Quran, but she said she already had one with her.

But the enemy, who are claiming to be Muslims, they ripped off her Quran when they assassinated her. They ambushed my daughter’s car on October 12, 2019, and committed this horrific war crime. Regardless of all humane ethics, they could have killed her with one bullet, yet they [attacker] had torn apart her body. When I uncovered her body, it was all gone, all her body was in pieces.

Before calling upon the humanity around the world, I would like to speak to my daughter, and assure her that we the women in Rojava will not let her sacrifice be in vain. The enemy, by killing Hevrin Khalaf, violated all human principles and brotherhood of people. The Rojava Revolution is led by women, and we as women will never surrender our will to the enemy. The US and Israel say they opposed against Turkish attacks, but in fact it was them who allowed the Turks to attack our homeland and took away my daughter.

The international community must have protected politicians and political activists; my daughter Hevrin was a civil politician, yet she was assassinated by Turkish forces on the soil of her homeland Rojava. She was leading the efforts in the Syria Future Party, a party which worked to ensure a free and democratic future Syria with all religions, ethnicities and minorities. Yet Hevrin was assassinated in a territory under the auspices of the US, and the US did not hold Turkey and Erdogan accountable for that crime.

My call to the UN, human rights organizations and the US is that I want justice to be done in the case of my daughter Hevrin. I want Erdogan to be held responsible for this crime. Hevrin devoted her life for unity and brotherhood of all people in the region, every perpetrator should be tried for her assassination.

·       A call came to my son, Hevrin’s brother. I could have heard her voice, but those who called where speaking Arabic. That was when I knew something extremely terrible had happened. I was afraid that she was taken as a hostage, and that we would never be allowed to see her again. Her phone could only be unlocked with her fingerprint, so they [the attackers] might have forced her to open the phone and computer before killing her. I could have hear people speaking in Arabic, and they were saying, ‘the vehicle is armored, but there is no fuel. Film me, [while I am doing this.]’

I could have also hear my Hevrin’s voice, she was telling them that she was head of the [Future Syria] Party, she might have been trying to open a dialogue with the assassins, but unfortunately they did not know that, and they killed Hevrin and her driver.

I tried to reach to her previous driver, and find a way to go to Tel Tamer, but the roads were blocked and I could only go to Hasakah. Then I was told that some injured were brought to Derik. I could have thought that she was killed, because in case of a sole shooting, she would have survived, because the car was armored. I arrived in Derik, and I saw Hevrin’s dead body. We held her funeral in Derik.


·       Three American delegations came to visit me after Hevrin’s assassination. The first delegation told me that the US has sanctioned Turkey because of Hevrin’s killing. I didn’t believe that, and I told them even if it was true, it would not be correct. I told the Americans that the US would symbolically do that, and sanctions might hurt the people not the government. I told them a real reaction would be to expel Turkey from the NATO, and would stop the bloodshed carried out by Turkey in Rojava.


·       I do not believe that the perpetrators have been arrested [by the US or Turkey], if so, there are international human rights courts, and they should be handed over to this organizations. If anyone has been arrested in this case, they must be tried in human rights courts, and a just decision must be taken.


·       I do not trust Turkey to try the murders of my daughter. Because the militants who killed Hevrin were operating under the general command of the Turkish state and military, and Turkish officials have their hands in this crime as of the very individuals who murdered Hevrin. If anyone has been or will be arrested by Turkey, in Hevrin’s case, Turkey could eliminate those individuals to wash their hands off this crime. I specifically see Turkish president Erdogan to be handed over an international court to be tried for the killing of my daughter. A war crime has been committed against humanity, and the very same person who ordered those militants, must be held accountable in a just court.

Part of it translation:

"Secondly, the Tayy tribe - it's pronounced "Tayy" because the Arabs do not spur - and this tribe surrounds Qamishli from all sides, especially since the tribe leaders consider Qamishli as an intimate part of the Tayy's monastery, and this is a subject of recognition by everyone.

This tribe is formed of a group of allied clans, and this applies to most of the clans of the Al-Jazira region. Therefore, it can be rightly said that the tribe is a political alliance. These clans are the Tayy al-Asliya (original Tayy), consisting of a group of subsets (Assaf, Al-Harith, and Al-Yasar), Al-Jawala, Al-Bani Sab'ah, Harb, Ar-Raashed, Al-Buasi, Al-Ghanamah, Muamara and Sharaabin.


This tribe extends to the north of Mosul within Iraqi territory, and as Hanna Batato [Palestinian Historian] mentioned a long time ago, the tribe also extends inside Syrian territory through a alluvial plain of more than 6,000 square kilometers and a population of more than 200-thousand people."



الــقبــائل والــعــشـائر الــعــربـيـة فـي الجــزيــرة الــســوريــة




تركي علي الربيعو



بعد الحلقة الاولى التي تحدثت عن القبائل الكردية في الجزيرة السورية. هنا حلقة عن توزع القبائل العربية تلك المنطقة لمناسبة الاضطرابات التي شهدتها اخيراً مع خريطة اولية لهذا التوزيع:

المقصود بالجزيرة السورية، الارض التي يحدها غرباً نهر الفرات وشرقاً نهر دجلة على الحدود السورية - العراقية - التركية. وتشمل الجزيرة محافظتي الحسكة ودير الزور، وسيقتصر حديثنا في هذه المقالة على العشائر العربية الموجودة في محافظة الحسكة.

تقع هذه المحافظة في الجزء الشمالي الشرقي من سوريا، وتبلغ مساحتها 26000 كلم مربع، اي بما يعادل مرتين ونصف مساحة لبنان، ومفردة الحسكة هي تعريب لاحق للكلمة التركية "الحسجة"والتي لا يزال البدو يلفظونها كذلك. وتعني بالعربية الارض التي يكثر فيها غيض الماء وذلك عندما كان يفيض نهر الخابور على الجانبين، والذي ينبع من مدينة رأس العين على الحدود التركية ويمر بالحسكة ليصب في نهر الفرات في محافظة دير الزور.

وتلحق بمحافظة الحسكة مجموعة من المدن حديثة العهد، أهمها مدينة القامشلي التي كانت مسرحاً لاحداث 12/3/.2004 وكلمة قامشلي بدورها تركية وتعني مدينة القصب او بلد القصب. وقد أنشئت مع بداية القرن المنصرم، وبالضبط في ،1928 فسكنها في البداية مجموعة من المهاجرين المسلمين والمسيحيين (الكاثوليك والبروتستانت) الذين نزحوا من مدينة ماردين التركية بعد أحداث سفر برلك الشهيرة، التي راح ضحيتها مئات الآلاف من الارمن والسريان على يد الجيش التركي والقبائل الكردية. كذلك الحال بالنسبة الى المدن الاخرى، المالكية (ديريك سابقاً) والقحطانية (قبور البيض سابقاً) وعامودا والدرباسية ورأس العين، وهي مدن تحاذي الحدود السورية التركية لمئات الكيلومترات.

وما يلفت النظر ان مجموع المدن السالفة الذكر، كانت تتميز بسيادة نمط ثقافي مارديني يتجلى على صعيد انتروبولوجي (فن الحياة والطبخ... الخ) حتى الثلث الاخير من القرن المنصرم، حيث بدأت بالتريّف على يد الجماعات المهاجرة الى المدينة من سريان ارثوذكس واكراد وبدو.

وانطلاقاً من أن البنية القبلية والعشائرية هي بنية تنظيمية وسياسية في آن واحد كما تعلمنا الانتروبولوجيا السياسية، يمكن القول إن البنية القبلية عند القبائل العربية وكذلك الكردية، كانت تتحدد على الضد من سكان المدينة. فقد كانت المدن المذكورة، الاكثر هشاشة والاقل تنظيمياً والاكثر عجزاً عن حماية نفسها تجاه المحيط القبلي الذي يكاد يطبق عليها. وهذا ما يراه حنا بطاطو في دراسته عن العراق، وفي الجزء الاول منها، الذي يطاول الطبقات الاجتماعية والحركات الثورية في العراق، من العهد العثماني حتى قيام الجمهورية. فالمجتمعات القبلية هي "مجتمعات من اجل الحرب"وبخاصة في مجتمع دَيْدنه الغزو والحرب، حيث يقع الغزو على مستوى بنية فوقية تمجد الغزو وتحتقر الزراعة والفلاحة وحتى سكنى المدن التي اشترى فيها زعماء القبائل بيوتاً جميلة لارتيادها في المناسبات القليلة. من هنا كانت التحالفات بين القبائل العربية والقبائل العربية والكردية ايضاً، "تحالفات من اجل الغزو والحرب". فقد كانت هذه القبائل بفرعيها تأنف سكنى المدن الناشئة، حتى بداية الثلث الاخير من القرن العشرين، الذي تميز بهجرة ريفية كثيفة الى هذه المدن كما أسلفت.

وفي الوقت الذي تنحصر فيه القبائل والعشائر الكردية في الشريط الحدودي السوري التركي، فإن القبائل العربية تنداح على مساحات جغرافية واسعة، تمتد من الحدود التركية السورية وصولاً الى الحدود العراقية، وداخل الاراضي العراقية، حيث لم تعرف هذه القبائل الحدود الدولية، الا لاحقاً، بعد اتفاقية سايكس - بيكو والعوازل والجدران التي فرضتها الايديولوجيات الثوروية التي حكمت المشرق العربي بالنار والدم. وهذه القبائل هي:

أولاً- شمّر: وهي من القبائل العربية الكبرى يمتد نفوذها، من نجد وامارة حائل في السعودية، الى الجزيرة السورية، مروراً بالعراق حيث حضورها الكبير، وبخاصة في اواسط القرن التاسع عشر، حيث تذكّر الليدي بلنت الانكليزية، التي زارت مضارب القبيلة على الفرات الاوسط، ان المجال الحيوي للقبيلة يمتد حتى طهران.

وهناك إقرار علني عند غالبية الباحثين ان شمّر فرع من طيء ولكنها الفرع الذي أصبح اصلاً بذاته، ويتوزع الشمّريون داخل الحدود السورية على مئات القرى، ابتداء من الحدود العراقية حتى القسم الشمالي من محافظة الحسكة. ولكنهم يشعرون بأن حيفاً تاريخياً أحاق بهم بعد اتفاقية سايكس - بيكو التي قطعت اوصال القبيلة، فباتت شمّر في سوريا، أقل تعداداً من حيث السكان من القبائل المجاورة لها كطيء مثلاً. ولكن هذا لم يمنعها من لعب دور وطني، كان الشيخ دهّام الهادي عنواناً له. فقد شارك في الحياة السياسية السورية وانتخب عضواً في البرلمان السوري، ورفض الانضمام الى المحاولات الرامية في النصف الاول من القرن العشرين الى تقسيم سوريا. وقد سعى من خلفه في مشيخة القبيلة وأقصد ابنه الشيخ حميدي دهّام الهادي الجربا الى لعب دور سياسي ولكنه تعثر على مرمى الجدار الراديكالي للسلطة، فسعى الى بناء تحالفات سياسية وبالاخص مع الاكراد، وفي مقدمهم الزعيم الكردي مسعود البارزاني.

ثانياً- قبيلة طيء: وتلفظ طي لأن العرب لا تهمز، وتحيط هذه القبيلة بالقامشلي من جميع الجهات، خاصة ان زعماء القبيلة يعتبرون القامشلي جزءاً من ديرة طيء، وجزءاً حميمياً منها، وهذا موضع اعتراف من الجميع.

تتكون هذه القبيلة من مجموعة من العشائر المتحالفة معها، وهذا ينطبق على غالبية قبائل الجزيرة، بحيث يمكن القول بدقة إن القبيلة هي حلف سياسي. وهذه العشائر هي طيء الاصلية المكونة من مجموعة من الأفخاذ (العساف والحريث واليسار) وعشائر الجوالة والبني سبعة وحرب والراشد والبوعاصي والغنامة والمعامرة والشرايين. وتمتد هذه القبيلة حتى شمال الموصل داخل الاراضي العراقية ومنذ زمن بعيد كما يذكر حنا بطاطو، وتمتد داخل الاراضي السورية عبر سهل رسوبي تزيد مساحته على أكثر من 6000 كلم مربع ويزيد عدد سكانها على 200 ألف نسمة.

وتذكر المصادر التاريخية، القديمة منها والحديثة، وأشير من الحديثة منها الى اطروحة الاميركي ولتر كيفي عن "بيزنطة والفتوحات الاسلامية المبكرة، 2003"ان طيء بقيادة الصحابي عياض بن غنم الفهري تمكنت في عام 17 للهجرة من فتح الجزيرة ومدنها (ماردين ودياربكر) وتمكنت من طرد هرقل الى شمال أنقرة. ويذهب ابن العمري في "مسالك الابصار في ممالك الامصار"الذي حققته المستشرقة الالمانية دوريتا كرافولسكي، الى وصف المعارك الشرسة التي خاضتها طيء عند قبر الصحابي خالد بن الوليد ضد المغول والتي انتصرت فيها عليهم.

على طول مسارها في تاريخ سوريا الحديثة، لعبت هذه القبيلة دوراً وطنيا، وشارك زعماؤها في الحياة السياسية السورية. وقد بيّنت الاحداث الاخيرة في القامشلي الدور الوطني لهذه القبيلة. فكانت مع ما يجاورها من قبائل، طرفاً اساسياً في المعادلة السياسية وفي صوغ لحمة الوطن. وهذا ما أكده زعيمها الحالي الشيخ محمد الفارس الذي كان عضواً في مجلس الشعب السوري، والذي يتحلى بكثير من الكياسة والرؤية السياسية لمستقبل المنطقة ومستقبل الدولة معاً. فثمة مخاوف حقيقية تحكم السلوك السياسي لابناء القبائل وشيوخها، من النموذج العراقي الذي غابت عنه الدولة، فأصبح المجتمع نهباً للدمار والموت، وهذا ما يفسر وقوف هذه القبائل والعشائر الى جانب الدولة في سعيها الى إقرار الامن في تلك المناطق، وذلك على الرغم من الحيف الذي لحق بهم، عندما كان الاكراد حلفاء السلطة، وعلى عكس عرب المنطقة الذين اتهموا بأن لهم ميولاً عراقية وصدامية؟

ثالثاً- قبيلة الجبّور: وهي كسابقاتها مبدأ تنظيمي وحلف سياسي، وتمتد هذه القبيلة على مساحة جغرافية توازي مساحة قبيلة طيء، كما تزيد عليها في عدد سكانها. وتمتد من جنوب غرب مدينة القامشلي الى مدينة الحسكة التي تحيط بها من جميع الجهات. اضف الى ذلك امتداداتها داخل الاراضي العراقية الى جنوب الموصل وشمال بغداد. وقد كان شيوخ هذه القبيلة هم الحكام الفعليون لمدينة الحسكة. وقد لعب الشيخ المرحوم عبد العزيز المسلط دوراً كبيراً في هذا المجال، ودوراً مهماً في الحياة السياسية السورية، لكونه معارضاً للنظام في سوريا، فنفي الى خارج البلاد لمدة طويلة. ويشغل ابنه الآن منصب شيخ القبيلة في حين يمثلها في مجلس الشعب الحالي ابن أخيه المدعو محمد أحمد المسلط.

رابعاً- قبيلة عدوان: وهي من القبائل الصغيرة، ويبلغ عددها ما يقارب 12 ألف نسمة، وتسكن في غرب مدينة رأس العين وجنوبها. وتتواجد بكثافة في مدينة رأس العين، ويرأسها الشيخ حلو محمد الحلو، وقد لعبت دوراً في الاحداث الاخيرة التي عاشتها سوريا، في سعيها الى فرض الانضباط والهدوء على مدينة رأس العين، وقدمت على مذبح تلك الاحداث اثنين من وجهائها؟

خامساً- عشيرة حرب: وتمثل امتداداً قرابياً لاحدى المكونات الاساسية لقبيلة طيء، ولكنها تتسم باستقلالها، وتحيط هذه العشيرة بمدينة رأس العين من الشرق والجنوب، وابتداء من الحدود التركية وانتهاء بجنوب مدينة رأس العين، ويبلغ عدد سكانها ما يوازي عشرة آلاف شخص.

سادساً- عشيرة بقارة الجبل: وهي امتداد لعشيرة البقارة التي تعود في نسبها الى الإمام محمد الباقر كما تؤكد ذلك. وتمتد من جنوب الحسكة الى دير الزور وحلب. ولا يتجاوز عدد بقارة الجبل العشرة آلاف وتسكن هذه القبيلة جنوب مدينة رأس العين حتى الحسكة.

سابعاً- عشائر الشرابين: وهي من أكثر العشائر العربية عدداً، ولكنها موزعة بين القبائل السالفة الذكر، فهناك شرابين شمر وشرابين طيء، وهم يمتدون بصورة كبيرة من جنوب الحسكة الى شمالها وعلى طول نهر الخابور، وصولاً الى مدينة رأس العين ومدينة الدرباسية، مما يرجح ان هذه القبيلة الموزعة الى مجموعة عشائر، تعود في اصولها الى قبيلة تغلب، وأنها بقيت تسكن الجزيرة ما بين خابور الحسكة وخابور دجلة منذ الفتح الاسلامي حتى هذا التاريخ. وقد طردتهم الحكومة الفرنسية من ضفاف نهر خابور الحسكة في العام ،1933 وجاءت بالآشوريين من العراق بعد المذبحة التي تعرضوا لها، وأسكنتهم على ضفاف النهر.

ثامناً- عشائر المغمورين: وهم من قبائل الولدة، وقد غمرت مياه نهر الفرات قراهم بعد اقامة سد الفرات، فعوّضتهم الدولة بإعطائهم أراضي في الشريط الحدودي السوري - التركي، بحيث اصبحوا كثافة سكانية في ذلك الشريط، وذلك على حساب الاكراد الذين ازدادت هجرتهم في اتجاه المدن او في اتجاه الهجرة الى الخارج، وهذا ما يثير حفيظة الاكراد الذين راحوا ينددون بالوجود العربي على اراضيهم.

وما يلفت النظر، ان هذه الكتل القبلية، تتداخل في ما بينها عبر جيوب قبلية تمتد من قبيلة الى اخرى، وتساعد على هذا طبيعة البنية القبلية المفتوحة التي تقوم على الاعتراف بالآخر وقبوله، اضف الى ذلك، ارتباط هذه القبائل مع بعضها البعض، بعلاقات مصاهرة تأخذ صيغة تحالف سياسي وتسويات سياسية تشكل جوهر الحراك القبلي على مسار تاريخي ومعاصر.

بقي القول، إن العقود الثلاثة المنصرمة من القرن العشرين، شهدت تبلور نخبة متعلمة من ابناء القبائل (اطباء، قضاة، مدرسون ومهندسون) استوطنت المدن الرئيسة في الجزيرة، وانخرط معظمها في صفوف حزب البعث العربي الاشتراكي مستفيدة من الولاء الحزبي الذي بات بمثابة الطريق الاقصر الى تحقيق غايات أنانية على حد تعبير فرانتز فانون في وصفه لمزالق الشعور القومي في العالم الثالث. وعلى الرغم من انخراط بعض المتعلمين الاكراد في صفوف حزب البعث، الا ان الغالبية العظمى منهم، تحولت من الماركسية فإيديولوجيا تمثلها الاحزاب الشيوعية، الى القومية، وكانت النتيجة نشوء حالة من التضاد وضعف التواصل بين النخبتين، وذلك على العكس من التواصل الذي كان سائداً بين العشائر العربية والعشائر الكردية.

من هنا فإن المطلوب هو تجسيد الفجوة بين هذه النخب عبر الانفتاح على بعضها البعض، والذي يمر اولاً بتجاوز مفردات الخطاب القوموي في الطرفين والتأكيد ثانياً على مفهوم المواطنة كقاعدة يقف عليها الجميع وينهض عليها الوطن والدولة الحديثة؟

(القامشلي)

http://hem.bredband.net/b155908/m129.htm

- "شاهدٌ على المقاومة"
- "الجرائم الدوليّة المرتكبة في عفرين"
إصداران كتابيّان من إصدارات المركز الإعلاميّ لقوّات سوريا الديمقراطيّة صدرا حديثاً.
كتاب "شاهدٌ على المقاومة"من تأليف القياديّ في قوّات سوريا الديمقراطيّة ،جميل مظلوم، الذي عاصر كلّ مراحل ثورة روج آفا.
يسرد الكتاب بلغة سلسة تجاذبات الأوضاع السياسية و العسكرية و التحديات التي واجهتها ثورة روج آفا من ذاكرة أحد مقاتليها.
5 February, 2020

https://www.facebook.com/zzzqamslosss/videos/914753925606283/

2020
Tal Tamr Military Council - leader unknown, spokesperson Demhat Brusk - (Source 1, source 2). Establishment: 10/02/2019 

2019
Tal Abyad Military Council (Gire Spi Military Council) - Riad Khamis Al-Khalaf (Abu Khalaf) (Source 1, Source 2). Establishment: 14/06/2019
Raqqa Military Council - Farhan Al-Askar (Abu Wael) (Source 1) Establishment: 20/06/2019
Kobani Military Council - Ismat Sheikh Hassan (Source 1) Establishment: 16/06/2019
Tabqa Military Council - Muhammad Raouf (Source 1) Establishment: 18/06/2019
Qamislo Military Council - Piling Qamislo (Source 1) Establishment: 19/09/2019
Al Hol Military Council - ? (Source 1) Establishment: 19/09/2019
Derik/Malikiye Military Council - ? (Source 1) Establishment 06/2019
Ras al Ain/Serekaniye Military Council - Imad Meno (Source 1) 27/06/2019
Hasakah Military Council - Hussein Salmo (Source 1) Establishment: 03/07/2019
Amude Military Council - Amed Amûdê (Source 1) Establishment:  04/07/2019
Shaddadi Military Council - Haji Abu Saleh (Source 1) Establishment: 06/2019
Hajin Military Council - unknown (Source 1) Establishment: unknown (not created yet)

2017
Idlib Military Council - leader unknown - (Source 1)  Establishment: 21/10/2017

2016
Deir ar Zour Military Council - Abu Khawala (Baggarah clan) (Source 1) Establishment: 12/08/2016
Jarabulus Military Council Mohammed Ali (Source 1) Establishment: 22/08/2016
Bab Military Council - Jamal Abu Juma (Source 1) Establishment: 14/08/2016

Manbij Military Council - Muhammad Abu Adel (Source 1) Establishment: 04/03/2016

2013
Syriac Military Council - Khabbur Akad  (Source 1, Source 2) Establishment: 08/01/2013

Map: (Source: Omran)

The Military Council of Syrian Democratic Forces held its regular meeting on Wednesday, May 20, in the presence of most of its members. The meeting discussed the military and security developments in the north and eastern Syria in particular, and in the Syrian arena in general, as well as the mechanism of organizational action of the forces and the level of effectiveness of local military councils and the obstacles and errors occurred during the past period in accordance with the program of restructuring the Syrian Democratic Forces adopted at the annual meeting of military councils. In addition to the programs and plans necessary to confront the threats and difficulties faced by the region from a military, organizational and economic aspects.

Within the meeting, the level of combat and defense readiness of our forces was studied, by increasing the level of qualitative training and preparing commanders and cadres competent for administrative and military work.

During the meeting, the General Command of the Syrian Democratic Forces provided a detailed explanation of the developments and actions carried out by the international coalition against ISIS, especially the positive results of joint counter-terrorism operations against the cells of the terrorist organization ISIS, despite the spread of the coronavirus and its negative effects, and the continuation of programs aimed at supporting local civil and military councils in order to enhance security and stability in the region and to prevent the re-emergence of the terrorist organization ISIS

The meeting also discussed joint work with Russian military forces operating in northern and eastern Syria, and their role in achieving the security and stability of the region and the need for continuity of coordination and cooperation, and the importance of its guarantee to the program of negotiation and political change in Syria.

The meeting also has discussed the requirements of the current stage and the need for careful follow-up of the acts of sabotage carried out by sleeper cells in the areas of northern and eastern Syria that are linked to various local and regional agendas. It also focused on the issue of ISIS terrorists detained by the SDF and the need to reach an international solution and consensus regarding their trial and its importance for justice for the victims of ISIS terrorism.

Our forces were commended for their efforts and their commitment to the guidelines and measures related to preventing the spread of the new Coronavirus, and the need to continue to take care and caution on this subject, as well as to emphasize the role that our forces must play in the face of fire hazards in the current harvest season, and to mobilize all existing possibilities alongside the civilian institutions concerned. The meeting praised the efforts of the General Command in unifying the Kurdish ranks and stressed the need to make efforts to unite all components of the region and opposition factions that reject the occupation.

SDF-Media Center

http://sdf-press.com/en/2020/05/the-regular-meeting-of-the-military-council-of-syrian-democratic-forces/

SDF Military Council meeting included:

في اجتماعه  المجلس العسكري لقسد  يدعو للحد من جرائم الاحتلال ويؤكد قدرته على تحقيق آمال الشعب
أكد المجلس العسكري لقوات سوريا الديمقراطية، في ختام اجتماعه على ضرورة إلزام تركيا بتنفيذ اتفاقية وقف إطلاق النار بشكل كامل، وتحمّل المسؤولية القانونية الملقاة على عاتقها، ووضع حد لهذه الجرائم غير الإنسانية، وشدد المجلس على قدرة قوات سوريا الديمقراطية على تحمّل مسؤولياتها التاريخية، وعلى التزامها بالدفاع عن مصالح كل مكونات المنطقة وتحقيق آمالها العادلة.

 خبر  16 كانون الثاني 2020, الخميس - 14:32 2020-01-16T14:32:00  مركز الأخبار
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عقد المجلس العسكري لقوات سوريا الديمقراطية  اجتماعه الدوري ،الأربعاء ١٥ كانون الثاني/ يناير الجاري، بحضور غالبية أعضائه، وقد قيّم الاجتماع الأوضاع الراهنة وتداعيات الغزو التركي، كما تم وضع البرامج والخطط المستقبلية للقوات.

وفي ختام الاجتماع أصدر المجلس بياناً ختامياً في يوم الخميس ١٦ كانون الثاني ٢٠٢٠، وشرح فيه مجمل تفاصيل الاجتماع الذي عُقد، والنقاط التي تم التركيز  عليها.

وكان الاجتماع ناقش استكمال تنفيذ  برنامج إعادة هيكلة القوات العسكرية من الناحية التنظيمية، وقيّم دور المجالس العسكرية المحلية، والمستوى الإيجابي الذي وصلت إليه.

وركز الاجتماع على ضرورة تطوير القوات العسكرية كماً ونوعاً، من خلال زيادة العدد والعُدة والعتاد، وكذلك عبر الدورات التدريبية الاختصاصية النوعية في كافة المجالات، لرفع مستوى الجاهزية القتالية للقوات بما يتناسب مع الأدوار المنوطة  بهم في هذه المرحلة.

كما أكد الاجتماع على أهمية وضرورة الحل السياسي من خلال المفاوضات مع جميع الأطراف المعنية، في إطار الاعتراف بالإدارة الذاتية القائمة في شمال وشرق سوريا، والإبقاء على خصوصية قوات سوريا الديمقراطية ضمن المنظومة الدفاعية والأمنية السورية المستقبلية.

وناقش الاجتماع اتفاقية سوتشي التي عُقدت بضمانة روسيا الاتحادية في ٢٢ تشرين الأول 2019، وأكد على التزام قواتهم بتنفيذ الاتفاقية وبنودها على أرض الواقع، في حين أن الدولة التركية لم تلتزم  بالاتفاق، ولا تزال مستمرة بخرق بنودها بشكل متعمد وممنهج، مما يهدد أمن وسلامة المنطقة برمتها،  وكان آخر ما قامت به هو إرسال طائرة مُسيّرة (درون) لتنفيذ عملية اغتيال عن بُعد، في منطقة تربه سبية بتاريخ ١٢ كانون الثاني الجاري، أسفر عن استشهاد اثنين من قوى الأمن الداخلي وإصابة آخرين بجروح.

الاجتماع ناقش أيضاً اتفاقية وقف إطلاق النار في الـ١٧ تشرين الأول/اكتوبر 2019 بين تركيا والولايات المتحدة الأمريكية، وأكد على عدم التزام تركيا ببنود الاتفاق رغم التزام قواتهم بها، "وأن الدولة التركية لازالت ماضية في تطبيق سياسات التغيير الديمغرافي والتطهير العرقي، بالإضافة إلى استمرار ارتكاب الجرائم اليومية بحق المواطنين المتبقين في المناطق المحتلة، والاستيلاء على ممتلكاتهم، وتوطين الغرباء في بيوتهم  بشكل ممنهج، وعدم السماح بعودة النازحين من السكان الأصليين، وممارسة سياسة الترهيب بحقهم من خلال الفصائل المسلحة التابعة لها".

وطالب الاجتماع الجهات الضامنة للاتفاقيتين بضرورة إلزام تركيا بتنفيذ الاتفاقية بشكل كامل، وتحمّل المسؤولية القانونية الملقاة على عاتقها، ووضع حد لهذه الجرائم غير الإنسانية.

كما سلّط الاجتماع الضوء بشكل خاص على الأوضاع الإنسانية المخيفة في مدينتي إدلب وعفرين، ونوّه أن ما يحدث فيهما هو نتيجة سياسات الدولة التركية وتدخلها في شؤون السوريين، والمتاجرة البشعة بدمائهم في عقر دارهم، وجدّد دعم قرار القيادة العامة لقوات سوريا الديمقراطية  في استقبال النازحين من إدلب وتأمين احتياجاتهم الإنسانية من خلال تواصلهم مع فصائل قوات سوريا الديمقراطية العاملة في المنطقة.

وتناول الاجتماع أيضاً عمليات التنسيق والمتابعة مع قوات التحالف الدولي لمحاربة داعش، وضرورة الاستمرار في الجهود المبذولة لإلحاق الهزيمة النهائية والمستدامة بهذا التنظيم الإرهابي، ومنعه من العودة من جديد، بالإضافة إلى عمليات التنسيق المتواصلة مع قوات الجيش الروسي العاملة في سوريا، وانتشارها وفقاً لاتفاقية سوتشي لما يحققه من أمن واستقرار في المنطقة، والتأكيد على ضرورة استمرارية هذا التنسيق والتعاون.

في النهاية أكد الاجتماع على قدرة قوات سوريا الديمقراطية على تحمّل مسؤولياتها التاريخية، وعلى التزامها بالدفاع عن مصالح كل مكونات المنطقة وتحقيق آمالها العادلة.

(هـ ن)

ANHA



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