President Obama has no ISIS strategy, adopting an indecisive, incremental approach, confusing tactics for strategy. ISIS confirmed its ascendancy with its capture of Ramadi in Iraq and Palmyra in Syria. It controls well over a third of Syria and a third of Iraq, including most of western Anbar province.
The U.S. must escalate airstrikes and aid Kurds and Sunni Arabs in Iraq, as well as Kurds and more moderate elements of the armed opposition in Syria. The U.S. should deploy Special Operations forces (SOF) and forward air controllers (FAC) to both countries. Obama must focus on degrading ISIS’s ability to wage war by targeting its command, control, and communications capabilities, as well as its cyber and intelligence nodes (C4I).
The coalition must sever ISIS’s exterior and interior lines of communications (LOC), undermining its ability to reinforce itself, redeploy forces quickly, and engage foes on many fronts simultaneously.
Retired Air Force Gen. Deptula correctly argues that the U.S. should intensify air strikes. Average daily airstrikes for Iraq and Syria combined are well under 15, as opposed to 85 in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, 50 in the toppling of Libya’s Qaddafi, and nearly 600 in the “shock and awe” phase of the second Iraq war. Only 25 percent of sorties even launch strikes. Deptula asserts that airstrikes must be an unrelenting “thunderstorm,” not a mere “drizzle.”
Airstrikes should target ISIS’s C4I capabilities in al-Raqqa, Syria, and Mosul, Iraq, the caliphate’s twin capitals, and hammer high value leadership targets (HVT). This would undermine ISIS’s ability to exert command and control. The U.S. should also strive to sever ISIS’s exterior and interior LOCs, undermining its ability to resupply itself and rapidly redeploy fighters.
Intensifying op tempo, while achieving precision, will require deployment of FACs to Iraq and Syria. The U.S. would also need to bolster Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.
As retired Navy Captain and Seal Robert Newson has asserted, the U.S. should deploy clandestine SOF strike teams in remote regions of Iraq and Syria, using SOF and CIA Special Activities Division Special Operations Group (SAD/SOG) personnel. These clandestine special mission units’ (SMU) would engage in surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence collection as well as hit HVTs, LOCs and major resupply routes. FACs embedded in highly mobile SMUs could call in airstrikes, as well as guide attack helicopters to targets.
The U.S. must recognize that Iraq and Syria are now historical fictions and may cease to exist, and that the Iraqi Army is dysfunctional and largely nonexistent, with the exception of Iraqi SOF and a few other units. The U.S. needs to recognize that the pro-Iran Shiite government in Baghdad is unwilling to make key concessions to Sunnis or Kurds, even faced with existential crisis.
In Iraq, the U.S. has little choice but to give direct aid to Kurdish Peshmerga fighters and use clandestine SOF and SAD/SOG personnel to organize and arm Iraqi Sunni Arabs. The Peshmerga should be encouraged to ally themselves with Yazidi and Christian militias. U.S. airstrikes and pro-Iran Shiite militia-led offensives will not defeat ISIS in Iraq.
In Syria, low op tempo airstrikes, combined with a pathetic, anemic “train and equip program,” do not constitute a strategy. First priority should be to escalate air support for Syrian Kurds’ Peoples Defense Units (YPG) and assist YPGs in pursuing unification of three Kurdish cantons, which would constitute a buffer zone on the Turkish border and imperil ISIS’s exterior LOCs.
YPGs, buttressed by US SOF and SAD/SOG personnel, should be encouraged to continue collaborating with Free Syrian Army (FSA) allies, as well as Assyrian Christian and Turkmen fighters. The U.S. should arm and provide air cover to remaining, viable FSA militias in the north and the FSA’s Southern Front. The US should collaborate with Jordanian intelligence and Special Forces in establishing safe and no-fly zones for more moderate rebels in Deraa and Suwayda provinces, which Jordanian King Abdullah reportedly is contemplating.
The U.S. should bolster its credibility with Syrian Sunnis and Sunni Arab countries by reasserting its commitment to ousting dictator Bashar al-Assad and opposition to Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah backing for Assad’s brutal regime. The U.S. could join Jordan and Gulf countries in exploiting factionalism and infighting in Damascus, triggered by Iranian hegemony, to weaken Assad. An alliance with regional Sunni powers, Kurds and more moderate rebels might give the U.S. leverage to press for a diplomatic settlement in Syria, at the expense of ISIS and radical jihadists.
Davis is a retired intelligence analyst, who worked with the Army Special Operations Command, Defense Intelligence Agency, Office of National Drug Control Policy and CIA.
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/homeland-security/247280-isis-strategy-bringing-order-out-of-chaos#disqus_thread
The U.S. must escalate airstrikes and aid Kurds and Sunni Arabs in Iraq, as well as Kurds and more moderate elements of the armed opposition in Syria. The U.S. should deploy Special Operations forces (SOF) and forward air controllers (FAC) to both countries. Obama must focus on degrading ISIS’s ability to wage war by targeting its command, control, and communications capabilities, as well as its cyber and intelligence nodes (C4I).
The coalition must sever ISIS’s exterior and interior lines of communications (LOC), undermining its ability to reinforce itself, redeploy forces quickly, and engage foes on many fronts simultaneously.
Retired Air Force Gen. Deptula correctly argues that the U.S. should intensify air strikes. Average daily airstrikes for Iraq and Syria combined are well under 15, as opposed to 85 in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, 50 in the toppling of Libya’s Qaddafi, and nearly 600 in the “shock and awe” phase of the second Iraq war. Only 25 percent of sorties even launch strikes. Deptula asserts that airstrikes must be an unrelenting “thunderstorm,” not a mere “drizzle.”
Airstrikes should target ISIS’s C4I capabilities in al-Raqqa, Syria, and Mosul, Iraq, the caliphate’s twin capitals, and hammer high value leadership targets (HVT). This would undermine ISIS’s ability to exert command and control. The U.S. should also strive to sever ISIS’s exterior and interior LOCs, undermining its ability to resupply itself and rapidly redeploy fighters.
Intensifying op tempo, while achieving precision, will require deployment of FACs to Iraq and Syria. The U.S. would also need to bolster Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.
As retired Navy Captain and Seal Robert Newson has asserted, the U.S. should deploy clandestine SOF strike teams in remote regions of Iraq and Syria, using SOF and CIA Special Activities Division Special Operations Group (SAD/SOG) personnel. These clandestine special mission units’ (SMU) would engage in surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence collection as well as hit HVTs, LOCs and major resupply routes. FACs embedded in highly mobile SMUs could call in airstrikes, as well as guide attack helicopters to targets.
The U.S. must recognize that Iraq and Syria are now historical fictions and may cease to exist, and that the Iraqi Army is dysfunctional and largely nonexistent, with the exception of Iraqi SOF and a few other units. The U.S. needs to recognize that the pro-Iran Shiite government in Baghdad is unwilling to make key concessions to Sunnis or Kurds, even faced with existential crisis.
In Iraq, the U.S. has little choice but to give direct aid to Kurdish Peshmerga fighters and use clandestine SOF and SAD/SOG personnel to organize and arm Iraqi Sunni Arabs. The Peshmerga should be encouraged to ally themselves with Yazidi and Christian militias. U.S. airstrikes and pro-Iran Shiite militia-led offensives will not defeat ISIS in Iraq.
In Syria, low op tempo airstrikes, combined with a pathetic, anemic “train and equip program,” do not constitute a strategy. First priority should be to escalate air support for Syrian Kurds’ Peoples Defense Units (YPG) and assist YPGs in pursuing unification of three Kurdish cantons, which would constitute a buffer zone on the Turkish border and imperil ISIS’s exterior LOCs.
YPGs, buttressed by US SOF and SAD/SOG personnel, should be encouraged to continue collaborating with Free Syrian Army (FSA) allies, as well as Assyrian Christian and Turkmen fighters. The U.S. should arm and provide air cover to remaining, viable FSA militias in the north and the FSA’s Southern Front. The US should collaborate with Jordanian intelligence and Special Forces in establishing safe and no-fly zones for more moderate rebels in Deraa and Suwayda provinces, which Jordanian King Abdullah reportedly is contemplating.
The U.S. should bolster its credibility with Syrian Sunnis and Sunni Arab countries by reasserting its commitment to ousting dictator Bashar al-Assad and opposition to Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah backing for Assad’s brutal regime. The U.S. could join Jordan and Gulf countries in exploiting factionalism and infighting in Damascus, triggered by Iranian hegemony, to weaken Assad. An alliance with regional Sunni powers, Kurds and more moderate rebels might give the U.S. leverage to press for a diplomatic settlement in Syria, at the expense of ISIS and radical jihadists.
Davis is a retired intelligence analyst, who worked with the Army Special Operations Command, Defense Intelligence Agency, Office of National Drug Control Policy and CIA.
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/homeland-security/247280-isis-strategy-bringing-order-out-of-chaos#disqus_thread
